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DOUBLE TROUBLE: LEGAL SOLUTIONS TO THE MEDICAL 
PROBLEMS OF UNCONSENTED SPERM HARVESTING AND 
DRUG-INDUCED MULTIPLE PREGNANCIES 
RONALD CHESTER* 
Why seek ye the living among the dead? 
  -Luke1 
Death does not end all things. 
  -Sextus Propertius2 
 
* Professor of Law, New England School of Law in Boston; B.A. Harvard, 1966; J.D. and 
Masters of International Affairs, Columbia, 1970; Diploma in Criminology, Cambridge (Eng.), 
1971.  Professor Chester is the author of the award-winning book INHERITANCE, WEALTH AND 
SOCIETY (1982), and has taught Wills, Trusts, and Estates at seven American law schools.  The 
author would like to thank Jamie Blum, J.D. New England 2000 (expected) for her work on the 
early stages of this project.  The author is also grateful for the energy, care and intelligence 
exhibited by his current research assistant, Kathryn Colson, J.D. New England 2000 (expected).  
She did a truly remarkable job. 
  Professor Chester also would like to thank his colleague, Professor Barbara Plumeri, for 
her insightful comments on an early draft.  Finally, he is grateful to the James R. Lawton Summer 
Stipend Program for funding the project, and to the New England School of Law and Dean John 
O’Brien for their encouragement and support. 
 1. Luke 24:5. 
 2. Sextus Propertius, Elegies, in PUTNAM’S DICTIONARY OF THOUGHTS 565b (1930).  See 
also PROPERTIUS 307 (H.E. Butler trans., 1962) where the line is translated slightly differently: 
“death is not the end of all.” 
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There was an old woman who lived in a shoe, 
She had so many children she didn’t know what to do; 
She gave them some broth without any bread; 
She whipped them all soundly and put them to bed. 
  -Anonymous3 
Every baby born into the world is a finer one than the last. 
  -Charles Dickens4 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In two previous articles, I called for government regulation of both assisted 
reproduction using frozen sperm after the death of the donor5 and human 
cloning.6  Despite the many calls for government regulation of the new 
reproductive technologies since those articles appeared, there has been little 
legislative reaction.7  Many experts in reproductive law and ethics seem 
content (or resigned) to leaving the control of such technologies to doctors and 
their individual arrangements with patients.8  Under this view, patients are free 
 
 3. Anon., There Was an Old Woman Who Lived in a Shoe, in THE OXFORD DICTIONARY 
OF NURSERY RHYMES 434 (Iona & Peter Opie eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1952). 
 4. CHARLES DICKENS, LIFE AND ADVENTURES OF NICHOLAS NICKLEBY 544 (Penguin 
Books, 1982). 
 5. See generally Ronald Chester, Freezing the Heir Apparent: A Dialogue on Postmortem 
Conception, Parental Responsibility, and Inheritance, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 967, 979 (1996) 
[hereinafter Chester, Freezing the Heir Apparent]. 
 6. See generally Ronald Chester, To Be, Be, Be Not Just to Be: Legal and Social 
Implications of Cloning for Human Reproduction, 49 FLA. L. REV. 303, 311 (1997) [hereinafter 
Chester, Cloning for Human Reproduction]. 
 7. See, e.g., Keith Alan Byers, Infertility and In Vitro Fertilization: A Growing Need for 
Consumer-Oriented Regulation of the In Vitro Fertilization Industry, 18 J. LEGAL MED. 265, 299-
312 (1997) (in which the author proposes various forms of in vitro fertilization regulation, 
including requiring statistical honesty, licensing clinics, controlling the quality of IVF services, 
and demanding the safekeeping of embryos); Judith F. Daar, Selective Reduction of Multiple 
Pregnancy: Lifeboat Ethics in the Womb, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 773, 791 (1992) (“to date there 
are no federal regulations governing the clinical practice of infertility therapy.”); Heidi Forster, 
The Legal and Ethical Debate Surrounding the Storage and Destruction of Frozen Human 
Embryos: A Reaction to the Mass Disposal in Britian and the Lack of Law in the United States, 
76 WASH. U. L.Q. 759, 772-74 (1998) (discussing the lack of regulation and need for appropriate 
legislation over the disposal of frozen embryos); Lori B. Andrews, The Sperminator, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 28, 1999, at 65 (a New York Bill banning posthumous sperm collection unless the man has 
previously consented to the procedure in writing is presently before the legislative assembly, 
Assembly Bill 8043, April 26, 1999); Marie McCullough, Fertility Clinics Eyed After Error,  
BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 31, 1999, at A3 (the case of a medical mix-up that left a white New York 
couple with twin sons— one white, one black— spawned questions about quality-control 
procedures in the baby-making industry and calls for greater regulation.); Jeff Israely, Italy Set to 
Pass Fertility Services Law, But Strictures Criticized,  BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 12, 1999, at A25. 
 8. See Andrews, supra note 7, at 64.  See generally Judith F. Daar, Regulating 
Reproductive Technologies: Panacea or Paper Tiger? 34  HOUS. L. REV. 609, 633-37 (1997) 
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to contract for reproductive assistance.  Should legal problems arise, courts are 
left to fashion decisions from common law principles, with little legislative 
guidance.9 
The dearth of statutory regulation of the new reproductive technologies led 
me to consider how common law and other approaches in fact or could work in 
different areas of assisted reproduction.  Two problems in reproductive 
medicine have lately drawn my interest: unconsented sperm harvesting from 
dead or comatose males and multiple pregnancies caused by fertility drugs.  
Since systematic governmental regulation of such problems seems increasingly 
unlikely, I wondered whether the common law and other approaches could 
handle these situations and, if so, in what ways. 
In this article, I first deal with non-statutory methods of addressing 
unconsented sperm harvesting and then use much the same method to deal 
with drug-induced multiple pregnancies.  After summarizing the various 
methods and discussing to what degree I think each would work, I conclude 
that common law actions for damages have some chance of succeeding with 
regard to drug-induced multiple pregnancies, but that injunctions seem the best 
way available to control unconsented sperm harvesting. 
II.  UNCONSENTED SPERM HARVESTING 
A. The Problem In General 
I begin with the proposition, basic to classical contract law, that competent 
adults are free to enter into any bargains they choose, provided that these 
bargains do not contravene public policy.10  It apparently does not contravene 
public policy for an individual to seek to reproduce with most, if not all, 
technological aids.  In fact, that individual may have a constitutional right to do 
so.11  Therefore, reproductive bargains, at least those of patient with fertility or 
other doctor, seem permissible on their face. 
 
(discussing the legal, ethical, and policy implications of assisted reproductive technologies 
(“ART”)); Marjorie Maguire Schultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: 
An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990  WIS. L. REV. 297, 324-25 (1990) (the author 
proposes that legal rules governing the importance and the legitimacy of individual efforts to 
protect intentions and decisions into the future); Sandra Anderson Garcia, Sociocultural and 
Legal Implications of Creating and Sustaining Life Through Biomedical Technology, 17 J. LEGAL 
MED. 469, 525 (1996). 
 9. See Chester, Freezing the Heir Apparent, supra note 5, at 974-76; Chester, Cloning for 
Human Reproduction, supra note 6, at 330-31. 
 10. See, e.g., Ronald Chester & Scott E. Alumbaugh, Functionalizing First-Year Legal 
Education: Toward a New Pedagogical Jurisprudence, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 21,  29-30 (1991). 
 11. See John A. Robertson, Posthumous Reproduction, 69 IND. L. J. 1027, 1044-45 (1994). 
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Obviously, a comatose or dead man cannot enter into a contract.12  A 
doctor may, however, act at the insistence of a third party, who wants the 
sperm (which some cases have called a type of “quasi-property”)13 for her own 
benefit.  If the man has left no instructions or will transferring the rights to his 
sperm to the woman involved, she would appear to have no legal right to the 
sperm.  Nevertheless, doctors can, and often do, harvest the man’s sperm for 
the woman’s procreative purposes.14  In the absence of a civil claimant, the 
doctor can do so without fear of either sanction or liability.15  While hospitals, 
fearful of litigation, generally demand a court order to refuse to treat or to 
terminate treatment, they do not appear similarly concerned by sperm 
harvesting.16 
As Lori Andrews reports: “Our unregulated approach contrasts greatly 
with the system in England, where the Human Fertilization and Embryology 
Authority, a Government agency, passes judgment on which fertility 
techniques are beyond the pale.”17  This agency has prohibited both human 
cloning and the use of a dead man’s sperm without his prior consent.  We have 
no such agency in the United States.18 
To change this situation, a recent bill to prohibit the practice has been 
introduced in the New York State legislature.19  Whether it will pass and be 
 
 12. However, if a man consents in advance to having his sperm harvested at his death, the 
male may have made an enforceable third party beneficiary contract with the doctor in favor of 
his intended female beneficiary. To be sure of enforceability, such a contract should be in writing 
to avoid the Statute of Frauds prohibition in many states on contracts not to be performed until 
after death. In states without the applicable Statute of Frauds prohibition, a writing is also 
advisable to show to the attending physician.  Although such a situation would be rare, one 
should also be used where the male intends to allow the harvesting to be done while he is merely 
comatose. 
 13. See, e.g., Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that the 
wife has a protected interest in her dead husband’s corneas); Arnaud v. Odom, 870 F.2d 304, 308 
(5th Cir. 1989) (a “quasi-property” right of survivors in the remains of their deceased relatives); 
Fuller v. Marx, 724 F.2d 717, 719 (8th Cir. 1984) (under Arkansas law, the next of kin has a 
quasi-property right in a dead body); See also James E. Bailey, An Analytical Framework for 
Resolving the Issues Raised by the Interaction Between Reproductive Technology and the Law of 
Inheritance, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 743, 763 (1998) (arguing that common law has increasingly 
begun to recognize quasi-property rights in the deceased’s body). 
 14. See Andrews, supra note 7, at 63. 
 15. See id. at 65. 
 16. See id. The U.S. Supreme Court held that comatose individuals cannot be forced to 
accept life-sustaining treatments. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 284 
(1990).  Andrews argues that “[n]either should they be forced to contribute to life-creating ones.”  
Andrews, supra note 7, at 65. 
 17. Andrews supra note 7, at 64. 
 18. See id. 
 19. In January, State Senator Roy Goodman introduced a bill, now pending in the New York 
Legislature, that prohibits postmortem retrieval of sperm for reproduction purposes from a 
deceased man unless the decedent gave explicit written consent thereto before his death and 
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signed into law, and if it is, whether it will be copied by other states, are open 
questions.  In addition to political difficulties, there may be constitutional 
problems with such statutes.  The woman involved may claim that her right to 
procreate can only be abridged if there is a compelling state interest in such 
regulation.20  It may be easier to overcome this problem in the case where the 
man is alive and has countervailing privacy, and perhaps property, rights of his 
own.  Once dead he would seemingly have no such countervailing rights.  Still, 
one might argue that although the woman might have procreative rights, she 
has no right to procreate with the sperm of this particular man in either of the 
described situations.21 
A good hypothetical case that raises the various issues in unconsented 
sperm harvesting would involve the second wife of a dead or comatose 
husband who wanted the sperm so she could have the couple’s only child.  
Pitted against her interests in creating a child and potential heir of the dead 
man might be those of existing children from the man’s prior marriage.  It 
would be well to keep this paradigm in mind during the discussion that 
follows. 
B. Self-Regulation By The Profession 
Can we look to the medical profession for self-regulation of sperm 
harvesting?  It is true, for example, that the American Society of Reproductive 
Medicine has developed a protocol entitled “Posthumous Reproduction”22 that 
 
unless the procedure is requested by his partner or spouse. See A.B. 8043, 222nd Leg., 1st Reg. 
Sess. (N.Y. 1999). 
 20. See Robertson, supra note 11, at 1044-45 (concluding that the right of women to 
conceive artificially includes the right to choose a donor, including a donor who is now dead). 
 21. But see Susan Kerr, Post Mortem Spem Procurement: Is It Legal? 3 DEPAUL J. HEALTH 
CARE L. 39 (1999).  Ms. Kerr states “it is legal to procure sperm from a dead man and use it for 
reproductive purposes.”  In general, the reasoning to support her argument is unconvincing.  For 
an example, see the bottom of page 47 where Kerr states that since a fetus is not a person for 
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment [Whitehurst v. Wright, 592 F.2d 834, 834 (5th Cir. 
1979)], then neither should a corpse be because it has “no potential for life.”  Surely Kerr would 
concede however, that sperm found within the male corpse has this “potential for life.” 
  On page 48, Kerr lists a number of cases in which causes of action involving interference 
with a dead body were brought by spouses or next of kin; this list would seem to indicate that it is 
not legal to intrude into a corpse.  Her explanation that “if the corpse were an entity capable of 
possessing rights, the action would belong to him or to his personal representative” is arguable, 
although it is neither necessarily true, nor dispositive.  Whatever the theory, for standing or 
recovery, the law’s distaste for such interference is plain. 
  On page 58, Kerr, without providing any case law to support her claim, states that 
“sperm has not been held to be legally willable.”  In apparent contrast on page 55 she states that 
“the issue in Hecht [Hecht v. Superior Court of L.A. County, 16 Cal. App. 4th 836 (Ct. App. 
1993)] was whether the sperm is considered property and, therefore, permissibly willable.”  Also 
arguably inconsistent is her statement on page 60 that “some courts recognize a right of a person 
to dispose of his own body in his will.” 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
456 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44:451 
attempts to address the problem.  But as Lori Andrews reports, “doctors do not 
need to request permission from an ethics committee to undertake the 
harvesting procedure.  Physicians can make their own ad hoc decisions for 
determining which requests should be honored.”23  For example, Dr. Cappy 
Rothman, a co-owner of the California Cryobank, has been performing the 
procedure since 1978, and has decided not to collect sperm from men who 
have had vasectomies.24  His assumption is that these men clearly did not want 
children.25 
When a Midwest teaching hospital consulted Andrews regarding six men 
in comas whose wives, girlfriends, or parents wanted their sperm, she 
recommended that the hospital not electroejaculate these men.26  Since no law 
or regulation actually prohibited the procedure, the hospital went ahead 
anyway.27  This example points out a reality about doctors: they are primarily 
in the business of trying to please patients and their relatives.  If legislators or 
others concerned with larger societal issues do not prohibit a requested 
procedure, most doctors will eventually bend to the requests of those paying 
their bills, unless a genuine legal threat looms as in the case of termination of 
life support.  Competition between fertility doctors and their refusal to endure 
the oversight of physicians in other specialties on hospital review committees 
further hinders effective self-regulation by the medical profession.28 
C.  Tort 
An eager district attorney might charge a doctor who removed sperm with 
an unconsented battery29 (in the case of a comatose man) or “mutilation” of a 
dead body,30  but this is highly unlikely, unless a particular district attorney is 
interested in making a moral or legal issue of unconsented sperm harvesting.  I 
 
  Finally, on page 68 Kerr draws a conclusion with which many may differ: “post mortem 
sperm procurement” is “simply a minimally intrusive invasilve medical procedure.”  For a brief 
explaination of this procedure, see infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text. 
 22. See Andrews, supra note 7, at 61; see also Michelle L. Brenwald & Kay Redeker, A 
Primer on Posthumous Conception and Related Issues of Assisted Reproduction, 38 WASHBURN 
L.J. 599, 605 (1999). 
 23. Andrews, supra note 7, at 64. 
 24. See id. at 63. 
 25. See id. at 64. 
 26. See id. at 65. Andrews considers the idea of procreation without permission “a radical 
one.”  Id. at 62.  She believes that “collecting sperm from comatose or dead men is perilously 
close to rape.” Id. at 65. 
 27. See id. at 65. 
 28. Interview with Dr. Mihai Dimanesceau, Neurosurgeon of  Freeport, New York in 
Lincoln, Mass. (Dec. 31, 1998).  Dr. Dimanesceau has chaired a number of these review 
committees. 
 29. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1. 
 30. See, e.g., 22 AM. JUR. 2D Dead Bodies § 58 (1988). 
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assume, however, that most district attorneys have plenty of rapes, robberies, 
and killings to prosecute without looking for unusual cases like these.  Still, 
such a battery could conceivably lead to liability in tort.  As the court stated in 
Cohen v. Smith, “protecting personal integrity has always been viewed as an 
important basis [for the tort of] battery.”31  Furthermore, a person’s right to 
refuse medical care is not to be interfered with lightly.  As Justice Cardozo 
stated, “‘ . . . a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient’s 
consent commits an assault for which he is liable in damages.’”32 
Who would bring such an action for battery?  If a comatose man has 
children, presumably one or more of them could petition to become guardian, 
or the court might even appoint a third party guardian (of the sperm) as a 
neutral between the children and the woman desiring the sperm.  The guardian 
could then bring the civil action, but damages for the comatose man would 
seem to be minor or nonexistent.33 However, if the children could establish the 
tort of battery against their father, they might then have an action for tortious 
interference with an expectancy of inheritance.34  This would depend on 
whether the law would consider the child produced through the sperm both a 
child and an heir of their father (once dead).35  There are a number of “ifs” in 
this equation.  Under current law, however, if the child were conceived after 
the death of the man, it would probably be considered either a child but not an 
heir, or not a child of the dead man at all.36 
If the children would have no action for tortious interference with their 
inheritance, could they still have one for the doctor’s infliction of emotional 
distress?  If the father was merely comatose, the use of machines to force 
ejaculation electrically might be highly disturbing to any children watching.  
An instrument resembling a cattle prod is inserted into the man’s rectum.37  An 
electric shock then causes involuntary ejaculation.38  If the father was already 
dead, the children or any relative or friend present would likely see the sperm 
being removed surgically,39 which could also be upsetting. 
It is unlikely, however, that children or others emotionally close to the 
father will be present, or within the tort laws’s “zone of harm,” particularly if 
their father is already dead.  Still, the California case of Christensen v. 
 
 31. 648 N.E.2d 329, 332 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995). 
 32. Id. at 335 (citing Schloendorf v. Society of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92 (1914)). 
 33. Also, the holder of a durable power of attorney for health care would presumably have 
standing if so authorized by the granting instrument. Cf. JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. 
JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 403-04 (5th ed. 1995). 
 34. See id. at 204 (discussing RESTATEMENT  (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 744 B (1979)). 
 35. See Chester, Freezing the Heir Apparent, supra note 5, at 987-93. 
 36. See, e.g., id. at 989-90. 
 37. See Andrews, supra note 7, at 62. 
 38. See id. 
 39. See id. 
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Superior Court,40 may give them a cause of action.  This case involved a 
mortuary where, instead of performing dignified burials and cremations as they 
were supposed to, workers mutilated the cadavers to procure organs to sell.41  
The court held that the mortuary had assumed a duty to close relatives who 
later found out about the practice, even though they were not present at the 
mutilation.42 
Ironically, the plaintiffs would want to prove only negligent infliction of 
emotional distress,43 rather than intentional infliction of such emotional harm, 
because the doctors’ and hospitals’ insurance policies would probably not 
cover intentional infliction of emotional distress.  Under Christensen, a claim 
for emotional distress would probably lie regardless of whether the man was 
alive when the sperm was harvested.  Mistreatment of a person’s body, unless 
done with concern for close relatives, can cause compensable emotional 
distress.44 
Since the level of intrusion into or mutilation of comatose or dead bodies 
in sperm harvesting does not appear to reach the extremes found in the 
Christensen case, the emotional shock upon learning of the procedures would 
seem to create only a moderate level of emotional distress.  Thus, damages, if 
available at all, would probably not be great. 
There is at least one other possible tort in this situation.  One might start 
with the proposition that sperm is a sort of property.45  Certainly it has value 
and is regularly exchanged for money in the case of sperm “donors.”  If a man 
can contract for its use or, as in Hecht v. Superior Court of Los Angeles 
County,46 will it or give it away at death, then taking it without the owner’s 
consent would seem to be conversion of that property.47 
 
 40. See generally Christensen v. Superior Ct., 820 P.2d 181 (Cal. 1991). 
 41. See id. at 185-86. 
 42. See id. at 196, 200-01. 
 43. For a discussion of a cause of action for the negligent infliction of emotional distress see 
Jill Trachtenberg, Living in Fear: Recovering Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Damages 
Based on the Fear of Contracting Aids, 2 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 529, 530-33 (1999). 
 44. See Christensen, 820 P.2d at 197.  The court held that it is foreseeable that close 
relatives, who are aware that funeral related services are to be undertaken but who are not present 
to watch the manner in which the remains are to be prepared for burial or cremation, may suffer 
serious emotional distress on learning that the decedent’s remains have been mistreated.  Id. 
 45. See, e.g., Bailey, supra note 13, at 762-63.  See also Erik S. Jaffe, “She’s Got Bette 
Davis(‘s) Eyes”: Assessing the Nonconsensual Removal of Cadaver Organs Under the Takings 
and Due Process Clauses, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 528 (1990) (arguing that property rights do exist in 
the human body and its constituent parts). 
 46. 20 Cal. Rptr.2d 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). 
 47. Conversion is defined as “an unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right of 
ownership over . . . personal chattels belonging to another.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 332 (6th 
ed. 1990).  See also DAN B. DOBBS & PAUL T. HAYDEN, TORTS AND COMPENSATION: PERSONAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY 53-55 (3d ed. 1997); Roy 
Hardiman, Toward the Right of Commerciality: Recognizing Property Rights in the Commercial 
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Conversion applies to the theft of a chattel, that is, to theft of physical 
property.  An exhaustive study by Professor Steven Bailey concludes not only 
that sperm is different in kind than blood, tissue and organs, but that, when the 
question has been presented, sperm has generally been treated by the courts as 
property, although they may not admit to doing so.48  The guardian or agent of 
a comatose man or heirs of a deceased man would arguably have an ownership 
interest in the sperm and thus a cause of action against the doctor and the 
woman for stealing the sperm.49  Damages seem uncertain or nominal, but 
assumedly an action for replevin of sperm, or an injunction against its use 
would lie.  Although such an action for conversion might well come too late to 
stop the retrieval of the sperm, it could generally be brought in time to prevent 
the sperm’s use. 
D. Contract 
Contracts with doctors are generally actionable at common law only if the 
doctor contracts with the patient to achieve a particular result.50  For example, 
in Sullivan v. O’Connor, a promise to perform plastic surgery, and thereby 
improve the plaintiff’s appearance, was found to be actionable.51  The problem 
in the present situation is that the comatose or dead man made no contract with 
the doctor regarding the use of his sperm.  He may, however, have previously 
contracted for a particular operation that proved unsuccessful.  A breach of 
contract can be found only if the surgeon made an express or implied promise 
to avoid harvesting organs, or in this case, special tissue called sperm.  If an 
organ donation directive has not been signed by the man, the surgeon might be 
held to an implied promise not to harvest reproductive tissue. The surgeon 
could then be sued by the man’s representative for breaking that promise.  The 
organ donation directive may not itself expressly cover harvesting of 
reproductive tissue like sperm.52 
Reproductive tissue is different from other tissue or organs because of its 
potential for creating new life.  One might want his organs harvested in case of 
 
Value of Human Tissue, 34 UCLA L. REV. 207 (1986) (discussing the rights individuals have in 
the commercial exploitation of his or her own body). 
 48. See Bailey, supra note 13, at 763. 
 49. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 50. See Sullivan v. O’Connor, 296 N.E.2d 183, 185 (Mass. 1973). 
 51. Id. at 184-86. 
 52. See UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, §1, 8A U.L.A. 29 (1993). Subsection (7) of 
Section 1 defines [body] part to include “an organ, tissue, eye, bone, artery, blood, fluid, or other 
portion of the human body.”  Although sperm is arguably a form of ‘fluid’ from the human body, 
sperm is unlike other fluids because of its capacity to procreate new life and thus it should not be 
covered by the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act.  See discussion infra note 156 and accompanying 
text.  For an opposing argument, see Kerr, supra note 21, at 63-64, in which Ms. Kerr 
recommends an amendment to the Uniform Act allowing procurement of sperm for reproductive 
purposes. 
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death in order to help others, but he may not want his sperm taken to create 
new offspring, and conceivably, new heirs.  Not only does a man have a 
protectible expectation that a surgeon not use his sperm in such a way without 
his consent, but society would seem to have an interest in not allowing the 
possible creation of offspring or heirs that the individual did not intend to be 
born. 
If we follow the Social Security Administration’s ultimate ruling that the 
posthumously conceived Judith Hart was entitled to benefits as a child of her 
dead father, then such a child could be considered an heir.53  This result may 
upset the estate plan of the father, or if no plan existed, the justifiable 
expectations of living heirs.  If the posthumously conceived child were, by 
contrast, viewed in the traditional manner as not being the child of the father, 
then the father would not be liable for the child’s support.54  In this case, the 
posthumously conceived offspring could become a financial problem for the 
state. 
E. The Fiduciary Relationship And Unjust Enrichment 
Another line of attack on unconsented sperm harvesting may be found in 
the law of confidential or fiduciary relationships.  A  doctor is in a confidential 
relationship with his patient, including one who is comatose.55  Is this 
relationship sufficient to create a fiduciary duty that is breached by the 
extraction of a kind of property, the patient’s sperm, and the unconsented 
transfer of that sperm to others? 
In the case of Moore v. Regents of the University of California, the 
California Supreme Court found that spleen cells extracted by a physician for 
his own profit did not constitute  property.56  However, the court said the 
 
 53. See Stipulation of Dismissal, Shalala (No. 94-3944) (dismissal dated Mar. 18, 1996).  A 
statement by Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, explained 
the settlement: 
In the interim, after consulting with the Department of Justice, we [Social Security 
Administration] believe it would be inappropriate to deny benefit payments to Judith Hart 
at this time.  As a mother two times, I admire the deep feelings of love that brought Judith 
Hart into this world and I applaud the miracles of modern medicine that resulted in her 
birth. 
Therefore, I have asked the Court to return the case to Social Security at which point I 
will order the immediate payment of benefits to Judith Hart. 
News Release, Social Security Administration, Mar. 11, 1996; see also Benefits Awarded to In 
Vitro Child, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 25, 1996, at A8 (reporting that the Social Security Administration 
agreed to grant benefits to Judith Hart, therefore eliminating the need for continued litigation); 
Melissa M. Perry, Fragmented Bodies, Legal Privilege, and Commodification in Science and 
Medicine, 51 ME. L. REV. 169, 184-93 (1999). 
 54. See generally Chester, Freezing the Heir Apparent, supra note 5, at 1012-25. 
 55. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 488-90 (Cal. banc 1990). 
 56. Id. at 489. 
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patient had a right of informed consent in this situation and pointed to the 
fiduciary duty that would apply to the doctor in the use of these cells.57  
Similarly, when a physician extracts a patient’s sperm, damages might be 
assessed against the doctor in tort for either breaching his duty to procure 
informed consent, or more broadly for breach of his fiduciary duty to the 
patient. 
Who would enforce such rights?  If the man remained alive, a guardian or 
holder of a durable power of attorney for health care could sue if so authorized; 
if the man was dead, the personal representative of his estate could sue.58  If 
the person wanting the sperm were the man’s wife, who might well be the 
lifetime representative or executor, she clearly would not bring the action.  
Although children of the couple or from a prior marriage, or their guardian ad 
litem might force the wife to resign due to a conflict of interest, this supposes 
that the children or guardian are cognizant of the threat to their interests as 
heirs and existing family members.  If the man is merely comatose, there may 
also be an action available to these individuals for either violation of the man’s 
privacy rights, or for battery.  If the personal representative were someone 
other than the wife or girlfriend, she would still need to understand the cause of 
action in order to bring it. 
Even if the doctor were found not to have breached a fiduciary duty, might 
his actions have unjustly enriched others?  If a new heir was born as a result of 
sperm harvesting, and was to take a share under wills law, could the theory of 
unjust enrichment be used to force the new child to hold this share in 
constructive trust for the previous children?  Under such a theory, the doctor 
could be viewed as unjustly appropriating the sperm –that is, doing something 
that the man did not consent to in his contract.  The problem is that the doctor 
is not the one unjustly enriched, but instead it is the woman or her child.  
Furthermore, the enrichment is not in the form of property appropriated, but  
“quasi-property”59 that has the potential to interfere with the existing children’s 
inheritance.  The possibilities of such an action succeeding seems too remote 
for further consideration. 
F. Tentative Conclusions On Sperm Harvesting 
In general, large sums of money are not involved in any of the causes of 
action discussed above.  One exception includes the cases in which existing 
heirs are deprived of their expected inheritances because a posthumously-
conceived child is allowed to share decedent’s wealth. A second exception 
arises when relatives assert a cause of action for emotional distress. Recovery 
based on emotional distress will depend on a court’s willingness to apply the 
 
 57. Id. at 485. 
 58. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 59. See Bailey, supra note 13, at 762-63. 
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reasoning in Christensen.  Even if a court were willing to do this, the damages 
might not be large. 
An alternative to a suit for damages would be an action for an injunction 
based on a combination of one or more of the causes of action mentioned 
above.  The extraction of sperm would probably occur before a plaintiff was 
able to stop it, so the injunction would most likely be against the use of the 
extracted sperm for procreative purposes.  If the sperm were considered 
property, the suit could also be styled as an action in replevin.60 
III.  MULTIPLE PREGNANCIES CAUSED BY FERTILITY DRUGS ALONE OR IN 
CONJUNCTION WITH IVF 
A. The Problem In General 
The failure of medical self-regulation in the area of unconsented sperm 
harvesting has also been present in cases of drug-induced multiple pregnancies.  
This costly medical nightmare has not been stopped by government legislation 
or regulation. 
A recent case to receive wide media attention was that of Nkem Chukwu, 
who gave birth to octuplets in Houston, Texas in December 1998.61  The 
largest of these children weighed only twenty-six ounces. The smallest baby, 
who was fifteen weeks premature, weighed only 10.3 ounces, and was 9¾ 
inches long.  This child died not long after birth.  Nkem had undergone 
aggressive drug therapy to stimulate ovulation.  Early in her pregnancy, she 
declined to undergo selective reduction62 “of the fertilized eggs, which might 
have given the remaining embryos a better chance of meaningful survival.”63 
 
 60. Replevin is defined as “an action whereby the owner or person entitled to repossession 
of goods or chattels may recover those goods or chattels from one who wrongfully detains such 
goods or chattels.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1299 (6th ed. 1990). For an argument that sperm 
would be considered property, and therefore a chattel, see Bailey, supra note 13, at 813-15. 
 61. See Rick Lyman, As Octuplets Remain in Peril, Ethics Questions are Raised, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 22, 1998, at A1.  See generally Janet L. Dolgin, Suffer the Children: Nostalgia, 
Contradiction and the New Reproductive Technologies, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 473 (1996) (reporting 
on the American myths of family and children and the effects reproductive technologies have had 
on these myths); Laura Meckler, Fertility Drugs Fuel Multiple Baby Boom, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Sept. 16, 1999, at A25. (reporting that more than 104,000 babies were born with at least one 
sibling in 1997, a 52% increase in twins). 
 62. Selective reduction is the process by which the number of fetuses carried by the woman 
is reduced.  The process involves inserting a needle through the woman’s abdomen into one of 
the gestational sacs where it is then maneuvered into the fetal chest and potassium chloride is 
injected. See Daar, supra note 7, at 779-80. Selective reduction may be performed because there 
are more fetuses than can be safely brought to term or because one or more have been found to be 
at risk for a disability. Compare Christine Overall, Selective Termination in Pregnancy and 
Women’s Reproductive Autonomy, in ISSUES IN REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 145-59 (Helen 
Bequaert Holmes ed., New York Univ. Press, 1994), with Mary Anne Warren, Abortion: New 
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The cost of caring for the pregnancy and the post-birth difficulties of the 
seven surviving Chukwu children will run into the millions of dollars.64  The 
risk of lifelong health problems and death for these infants is so high that Dr. 
Mark Perloe of the Atlanta Reproductive Health Center called their birth “a 
wake-up call for the profession.”65  Commenting on the Chukwu births, Alan 
Copperman of Mt. Sinai Medical Center said “the vast majority of these cases 
end in disaster, sometimes for the mom, most often for the babies.”66  Dr. Mark 
Evans of Wayne State University said that “although these babies were born 
alive, the odds are that there will not be happy outcomes for at least some of 
them.”67  Thus, experienced medical professionals view the Chukwu births not 
as cause for great celebration, as did some of the mainstream media, but as a 
disaster.68 
In 1997, Bobbi McCaughey, still in her twenties, gave birth to septuplets.  
John Leo, a columnist for U.S. News and World Report, stated: 
Th[e] doctor, Katherine Hauser, certainly can be second-guessed for 
overseeing a pregnancy begun when Bobbi McCaughey’s ovaries contained at 
least seven mature eggs.  The drug Metrodin stimulates egg production, but 
those eggs can be counted through ultrasound, and doctors usually advise a 
couple to abstain from sex until the next cycle if the egg count is high.  Instead 
of explaining what she did and why, Hauser opted for an irrelevant argument 
based on rights, testily asking reporters, “Should we as a society dictate to 
individuals the size of their families or their choices of reproductive care?”  
Answer: No.  But doctors ought to be able to count to seven, and when 
counseling a couple, they have a moral obligation to explain the predicament 
and awful options that confront a woman who is carrying seven fetuses.69 
In addition to the health risks posed to infants, 70 the carrying of so many 
fetuses poses a threat to the mother’s health.  As Leo points out, “[i]f Bobbi 
 
Complexities, in ISSUES IN REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 113-21 (Helen Bequaert Holmes ed., 
N.Y. Univ. Press, 1994.). 
 63. See Lyman, supra note 61, at A18. 
 64. Id. at A1. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at A18. 
 67. Id.  However, for an article claiming that the seven remaining Chukwu infants are doing 
well thus far, see Last Texas Octuplet Now at Home, CINCINNATI POST, June 26, 1999, at 16A. 
 68. See, e.g., Dave Goldfinger, 7 Wonders of the Modern World, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 
30, 1999, at 32. 
 69. See John Leo, A New Medical Skill: Counting, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Dec. 8, 
1997, at 20. 
 70. On November 19, 1999, the septuplets—Kenny, Brandon, Joel, Nathan, Alexis, Kelsey 
and Natalie—turned two.  Of the seven children, four suffer from some sort of adverse physical 
condition.  Two of the children have cerebral palsy and must use walkers: Alexis has hypotonic 
quadriplegia which causes muscular weakness in all four limbs, and Nathan has spastic diplegia 
which causes uncontrollable muscle tightening in his legs.  Nathan’s lower body and leg muscles 
have been rigid since birth and Alexis has little strength in her trunk and cannot walk or sit up 
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McCaughey had been in her late 30s or early 40s, like the typical woman 
seeking treatment, she might not have survived the seven births.  Even in their 
20s, women carrying multiple fetuses are at risk for fatal blood clots and other 
complications.”71 
What induces doctors to recommend aggressive drug therapies?  Leo again 
puts it well: 
The fact that the fertility business is a rapidly expanding $4 billion industry 
plays a role . . . .  The industry is by and large for-profit and unregulated.  
Competitiveness and all the talk about “market forces” meeting “consumer 
demand” set the stage for overly aggressive treatment and quick results that 
can be advertised and used against competitors in the pursuit of more 
customers.  Some sales pitches come with money-back guarantees.  In this 
overheated commercial climate, many are skeptical that those doing the selling 
encourage the customers to think things through.  Like all industries, the 
fertility business inevitably feels pressure to skip all the fuss about ethics and 
just give the customer what she wants.72 
Like Nkem Chukwu, the McCaugheys apparently had moral objections to 
“fetal reduction.”  This made the dangers to the mother and infants inevitable.  
Ultimately, these objections cost the McCaugheys “one million dollars in 
medical costs to bring the septuplets through infancy.”73 
Generally, the possibility of multi-fetal reduction should be discussed with 
a patient like Ms. Chukwu before administration of fertility drugs.  The doctor 
can then decide how aggressive to be with the drug therapy based on whether 
fetal reduction will later be permitted.  In Ms. Chukwu’s case, the doctor 
evidently entered into an aggressive drug program before knowing whether the 
patient would agree to the reduction procedure if too many fetuses proved 
viable.74 
This apparent failure of the medical profession to timely disclose the risks 
of drug therapy may be related to a general problem with the use of 
reproductive drugs.  Under pressure from anti-abortion groups, the United 
 
without help.  Recent scans revealed that both children have underdeveloped brain areas.  Alexis 
also suffers from digestive problems and both she and her sister, Natalie, have to rely primarily 
on feedings of high-calorie formula through tubes in their stomachs.  A fourth child, Joel, has a 
condition which causes one of his eyes to drift and cross.  See, e.g., 3 Iowa Septuplets Battling 
Serious Health Problems, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 9, 1999 at A11.  See also Becky Bohrer, 
McCaughy Septuplets Turn 2 Today, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 19, 1999, at A9. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 21. 
 73. Id. at 20. See also Daar, supra note 7, at 775.  The lawsuit in the Frustaci case was 
settled for a reported sum of $6.2 million almost six years after Patti Frustaci filed a malpractice 
and wrongful death lawsuit against the fertility specialist and the fertility medical center involved 
in her treatment.  Id. at 775-83. 
 74. See Lyman, supra note 61, at A18. 
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States government has failed to allocate money for reproductive research.75  
Thus, the medical profession is not entirely clear on what the proper dosages 
and uses of these fertility drugs are.76  In addition, a gynecologist with only 
four weeks training during residency has as much access to the drugs as an 
experienced practitioner.77  This lack of knowledge and lack of self-regulation 
is present even though the demands for children from aging, childless couples, 
keep increasing.78 
In slightly under ten percent of cases resulting in drug-induced multiple 
pregnancies, in vitro fertilization is used.79  Unlike the situation with Ms. 
Chukwu, this procedure gives the fertility doctor considerably more control 
over multiple births, since he or she can decide the number of eggs to be 
implanted.  Still, there is pressure from infertile couples, even those who have 
not agreed in advance to selective reduction, to implant more, rather than fewer 
fertilized eggs to increase chances of success. 
Of course there is the further question of whether selective reduction, even 
if chosen, is ethical and should be performed at all.  Some patients and doctors 
consider it an unethical form of early abortion, despite the fact that it is legal 
under Roe v. Wade.80  Usually, those embryos easiest to reach in the mother’s 
womb are injected with fatal doses of potassium chloride.81  This lottery, 
which leaves to pure chance who shall have a chance at life and who shall not, 
is morally troublesome, but perhaps less so than culling out the “weakest” 
embryos.82  On the other hand, advocates of the procedure differentiate it from 
abortion, arguing that while abortion seeks merely to destroy life (or potential 
life), selective reduction seeks to increase the chance for life for those embryos 
not killed, by elimination of the others.83 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. See id. 
 77. See id. 
 78. See id. at A1. 
 79. See Lyman, supra note 61, at A18. 
 80. See Daar, supra note 7, at 780. 
 81. See id. at 780-81; see also Geoffrey Cowley & Karen Springen, More is not Merrier: 
When Fertility Drugs Work Too Well, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 26, 1996, at 49 (reporting case of Mandy 
Allwood, a 31 year old British woman who conceived eight babies using the fertility drug 
Metrodin); Leo, supra note 69, at 21 (Dr. Mark Evans, the Wayne State University obstetrician 
who pioneered the procedure of selective reduction, recently told one couple, “We don’t see 
anything obviously wrong with any of them, so we’re just debating which one is easiest to get 
to”). 
 82. Cf. Daar, supra note 7, at 781 (noting that doctors will sometimes first eliminate fetuses 
with gross abnormalities). 
 83. See id. at 783.  Daar calls selective reduction “[A] lifeboat  in the womb in which some 
must die for the others to live.” Id. at 784; see also Leo, supra note 69, at 21 (Arthur Caplan, 
director of Bioethics at the University of Pennsylvania said, “you can make a moral case to end 
lives in order to rescue lives”). 
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In England, the multiple-pregnancy problem does not have to be solved 
through common law means because there is government regulation.  Under 
the Voluntary Licensing Authority’s guidelines, English doctors are limited to 
implanting a maximum of three embryos.84  There is, however, some evidence 
that doctors evade this regulation due to the lack of effective sanctions against 
them, particularly where no one wants to complain to the authorities. 
If the United States tries to place such a limit on fetal implantation, the law 
and/or regulation would likely be struck down as an unconstitutional violation 
of a woman’s right to procreate.85  Only if a conservative court decided that 
women have a right to procreate only by “natural” means could such a law or 
regulation withstand strict scrutiny.  Such a decision seems unlikely, however, 
because this would appear to create a discriminatory classification: fertile 
women would have the constitutional right to procreate, while infertile women 
would not.86  With such constitutional problems brewing, politicians, already 
frightened of regulating in the explosive reproductive rights area, would most 
likely demur.  Besides, the emphasis on individualism in this country87 and the 
apparent preference to medicalize rather than to legalize such problems,88 
encourages legislators to defer to the arrangements made by doctors with 
patients. 
As with unconsented sperm harvesting from the dead or comatose males, 
the multiple-birth conundrum leaves us asking how this procedure can or 
should be controlled.  Meaningful legislation or administrative regulation 
seems unlikely, due to political fears of stirring up the anti-abortion advocates, 
general lack of sophistication of legislators, and possible constitutional 
problems.  As long as the right to procreate is conceived of as extending to 
drug-induced pregnancy, the state needs a “compelling state interest” in order 
to regulate this procedure.89 
B. Self-Regulation By The Profession 
As in the case of unconsented sperm harvesting, self-regulation of the 
multiple pregnancy problem by fertility specialists, who are in competition 
with each other, seems nearly hopeless.  A leading physician who has headed a 
 
 84. See Daar, supra note 7, at 791-92 n.83. 
 85. Compare Chester, Freezing the Heir Apparent, supra note 5, at 979-85, with Lawrence 
Wu, Family Planning Through Human Cloning: Is there a Fundamental Right? 98 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1461 (1998) (presenting and then refuting arguments against affirmative constitutional right 
to procreate through assisted reproductive technologies). 
 86. Cf. Robertson, supra note 11, at 1029. 
 87. See Chester, Freezing the Heir Apparent, supra note 5, at 969-70. 
 88. See Chester, Cloning for Human Reproduction, supra note 6, at 309. 
 89. See Robertson, supra note 11, at 1040-41 (stating that if posthumous reproduction is a 
fundamental right, a state will have to show a compelling interest before it may interfere with that 
right). 
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number of medical ethics or review committees has pointed to their 
ineffectiveness in regulation.90  Fertility specialists are, for example, unwilling 
to accept the verdict of physicians with other specialties, particularly when it 
involves their own livelihood.91 
The truth is that doctors are more likely to reduce multiple pregnancies by 
improving their medical techniques than by regulating themselves.  A recent 
advance at Stanford Medical School, for example, allows for greater time in 
the “petri dish” for the fertilized egg/embryo.  Embryos stay in the IVF 
program’s specialized culture for five days rather than the usual three.92  This 
procedure, which corresponds more closely to nature’s timing, enables doctors 
to get a much better “read” on which embryos, when implanted, will produce 
successful fetuses.93  With greater understanding of which embryos will be 
successful, fewer need to be implanted and the risk of multiple pregnancy is 
correspondingly reduced.94 
Amin Milki, medical director of Stanford’s IVF and Assisted Reproductive 
Technology Lab reports that this new technique has helped patients achieve a 
high pregnancy rate “without having to gamble too much with a risk of having 
more than twins.”95  The new procedure achieved nearly a 70% pregnancy 
success rate for the first 43 women who used it—a rate that compares very 
favorably with the slightly less than 30% rate utilizing conventional 
techniques.96 
C. Can Insurers Control The Multiple Pregnancy Problem? 
Since substantial money (and potential damages) are involved in these 
multiple-birth situations (unlike the unconsented sperm harvesting cases), 
health insurers and HMOs may have a significant role to play in controlling 
them.  At last count, 12 states mandated that some form of insurance for 
fertility treatments at least be offered by insurers.97  The Chukwu infants were 
 
 90. See Interview with Dr. Mihai Dimanesceau, supra note 28; see also Andrews, supra note 
7 (discussing the difficulty in discouraging doctors from forcibly removing sperm from comatose 
patients). 
 91. Id. (noting that doctors do not need to request permission before undertaking the 
procedure and can create their own criteria to determine when the procedure is appropriate). 
 92. See In Vitro-With Fewer Multiple Births, FARM REPORT NEWS, (Stanford University 
Alumni Bulletin), Jan.-Feb. 
 93. See id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. See id. 
 97. See Blaine LeCesne, Access and Insurance Issues in Pushing Boundaries: An 
Interdisciplinary Examination of New Reproductive Technologies, Address at Loyola university 
New Orleans School of Law, Symposium, Pushing the Boundaries: An Interdisciplinary 
Examination of New Reproductive Technologies, § K (Oct 16/17, 1998) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author).  Since 1987 Arkansas requires all health insurers, except 
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born in Texas, a state that requires certain insurers that cover pregnancy 
service to offer coverage for infertility services.98 
Presumably this coverage costs extra and was bought by Ms. Chukwu 
(whose husband is a respiratory therapist).  Massachusetts has an even stronger 
law, requiring HMOs and insurance companies that cover pregnancy to cover 
medically necessary expenses of infertility diagnosis and treatment (not merely 
offer it as an option at increased cost).99 
Of course, the majority of states still do not have any statutes requiring 
health insurers to do anything about fertility treatments.  If patients have no 
coverage at all, they will exert extreme pressure on their fertility doctors to 
achieve quick results with their expensive treatments.  This in turn stimulates 
more aggressive drug protocols.  However, even in a state such as 
Massachusetts that mandates the coverage, problems arise.  Tufts Health Plan, 
one of Massachusetts’ largest and most successful plans, recently announced 
that it was “cutting off” three fertility centers that were not achieving high 
enough success rates with their treatments.100  It would seem then that such 
pressure from health insurers is counterproductive in reducing multiple 
pregnancies.  After all, to achieve a higher “success rate,” doctors need only 
increase their use and dosage of fertility drugs—more fertilized embryos will 
produce higher success rates. 
Generally, if pregnancy services are covered by health insurance, so is the 
neonatal care of any resulting infants.101  Since the cost of this care in a case 
 
HMOs, that cover maternity benefits to cover IVF; since 1989 California requires that certain 
insurers offer coverage for infertility diagnosis and treatment; since 1989 Connecticut requires 
that certain insurers offer coverage for infertility diagnosis and treatment; since 1987 Hawaii 
requires a one-time benefit for outpatient costs resulting from IVF; since 1991 Illinois requires 
that insurance policies that cover more than 25 people to cover the costs of diagnosis and 
treatment of infertility; since 1985 Maryland requires that insurance policies that cover pregnancy 
cover the cost of IVF; since 1987 Massachusetts requires that HMOs and insurance companies 
that cover pregnancy cover medically necessary of infertility diagnosis and treatment.  Since 1987 
Montana requires that insurers include infertility services as part of basic “health care services.”  
Since 1990 New York requires that insurers provide coverage for the “diagnosis and treatment of 
correctable medical conditions,” which definition does not encompass IVF. Since 1991 Ohio 
requires that HMOs cover basic preventive care, including infertility services. Since 1989 Rhode 
Island requires that insurers provide coverage for diagnosis and treatment of infertility, but allows 
co-payment up to 20% R.I. Gen. Laws.  Since 1987 Texas requires that certain insurers that cover 
pregnancy service offer coverage for infertility services.  See id. 
 98. See id. 
 99. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 47H (West 1997). 
 100. See Richard Saltus, Insurer Drops 3 Fertility Clinics/ Tufts Health Plan Says Facilities 
Don’t Meet Criteria, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 6, 1999, at A1. 
 101. Telephone Interview with John A. Robertson (Oct. 5, 1999). For a discussion of the role 
of health insurance in reproductive technologies specifically in vitro fertilization see generally 
Peter J. Neumann, Should Health Insurance Cover IVF? Issues and Options, 22 J. HEALTH POL. 
POL’Y & L. 1215 (1997). See also Comment, In Vitro Fertilization: Insurance and Consumer 
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like that of Ms. Chukwu far exceeds the cost of the fertility treatments 
themselves, one would think that insurers offering this coverage would want to 
deter doctors from using overly aggressive therapies.  So far, I have seen no 
evidence that this is the case. Highly expensive neonatal care situations like 
that of the Chukwu infants should persuade insurers like Tufts not to 
encourage “success rates” at any price.  Of course, as long as medical oversight 
can keep extreme situations like that of the Chukwu infants to a minimum, 
insurers will be more concerned with the costs of fertility treatments 
themselves than with the relatively rare expenses stemming from post-birth 
care of infants from multiple pregnancies.102 
If the care of multiple-birth infants is not covered by insurance, couples 
like the Chukwus will have to rely on massive publicity by the media to 
stimulate donations (as well as payments for their story) in order to pay the 
millions of dollars required for their children’s care.103  The more common 
multiple births become, however, the less publicity they will generate.  Once 
couples can no longer rely on the media for help, uninsured couples having 
three to seven births will turn to private law and lawyers for aid with their 
dilemma. 
D. Contract 
Contract law is much more directly involved in the multiple pregnancy 
problem than in unconsented sperm harvesting.  Since the American 
government is leaving fertility treatment largely unregulated, one may view an 
 
Protection, 109 HARV. L. REV. 2092 (1996) (suggesting recommendations aimed at promoting 
predictability and protecting consumers’ ability to make rational and informed choices about 
insurance and about IVF treatment itself). 
 102. Since insurance usually covers neonatal care no matter how children are conceived, 
increased high-order multiple births may cause insurers to begin writing policies limiting their 
exposure for neonatal expenses, perhaps by covering expenses only for a set number of births.  
See Robertson Interview, supra note 101.  Also, it is conceivable that insurers could simply put a 
dollar cap on neo-natal expenses from a given pregnancy. 
 103. See Lawrence K. Altman, Ounce by Ounce, Surviving Octuplets Showing Progress, 
CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Jan. 17, 1999, at A14. The doctor for Ms. Chukwu and the head of the 
neonatal unit, Dr. Leonard E. Weisman, estimated the total cost for the octuplets at about $2 
million. The amount will be covered by the health insurance that the father receives though his 
work at a hospital; Leigh Hopper, Multiple Blessings/ Prayers Mark Homecoming of Nos. 4 and 
5, HOUSTON CHRON., Apr. 18, 1999, at 35 (The father stated:  “I have insurance, but there are 
some things that are not covered.  I have to take care of the kids.”); Barbara Whitaker, Sextuplet 
Survivors Aren’t in the Limelight, Miss Gifts Other Births, Backlash Seem to Block Aid, ARIZ. 
REPUBLIC, July 5, 1999, at A6 (reporting that whereas the Chukwus received a 5,300 square foot 
home, a tractor-trailor loaded with baby furniture, and all the diapers they needed, the birth of 
sextuplets by Chris Ann Collins was overshadowed by the birth of the McCaughey septuplets in 
Iowa and the octuplets of Ms. Chukwu.  Although insurance covered $2.5 million of the cost of 
the births and extended hospital care, the Collinses are now faced with $100,000 in remaining 
medical bills). 
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agreement for fertility services as merely another contract.  However, upon 
closer analysis, it becomes clear that we are not dealing with an arm’s-length 
bargain between roughly equal parties. 
First of all, the patients are often psychologically desperate, viewing the 
fertility center as their last hope to help them conceive a child.104  This puts 
them in a very weak bargaining position vis-a-vis the medical “experts” who 
offer this “one last chance.”  Moreover, the patients are confronted by sleek 
brochures and professionally prepared videotapes. 
Despite my extensive review of the brochures and other materials offered 
by the Fertility Center of New England and Reproductive Science 
Associates,105 I saw nothing at all about the risks of various infertility 
techniques, including multiple births and the option of selective reduction to 
prevent them.  In general, the picture painted is one of caring professionals 
who, with  many advanced techniques at their disposal, are almost certain to 
produce a successful pregnancy.  Whether such a “picture” contains promises 
that might be actionable in the case of multiple pregnancy depends on the 
specific details of the advertising packet. 
The “contract” between fertility doctor/clinic and patient may contain 
elements of the center’s advertising, as well as oral assurances and the contents 
of any written release authorizing the services decided upon.  States cannot 
prohibit such reproductive contracts because the constitutional right to 
procreate probably extends to the right of a couple, particularly a married one, 
to procreate by non-coital means.106  Although the state may regulate the 
circumstances under which such contracts are formed, it could not bar or refuse 
to enforce such contacts altogether without a “compelling” reason.107 
Since such contracts would probably not be prohibited by statute, courts 
could not refuse to enforce them on the ground that the subject of the 
agreement is “illegal,” as against established public policy.108  The one-
sidedness of these bargains could, however, give rise to relief for the weaker 
party (patient) under doctrines such as unconscionability, which apply to 
 
 104. See Leo, supra note 69, at 20. 
 105. See REPRODUCTIVE SCIENCE CENTER OF BOSTON,  pamphlets: DIAGNOSING 
INFERTILITY; CONVENTIONAL INFERTILITY TREATMENTS; ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGY PREDICTING SUCCESSFUL IVF; see also Fertility Center of New England, Inc. 
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 106. See John A. Robertson, Liberalism and the Limits of Procreative Liberty: A Response to 
My Critics, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 233, 233-34 (1995) [hereinafter Roberson, Procreative 
Liberty]. 
 107. See Robertson, Posthumous Reproduction, supra note 11, at 1040-41. 
 108. See generally E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 321-68 (3rd ed. 1999) (describing 
what types of contracts are “illegal”). 
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contracts of adhesion.109  Related actions might be brought under applicable 
statutes that cover these patients as consumers.110 
Doctors can prevent a court from policing its fertility agreement for 
unfairness by making full disclosure of the risks to be undertaken.  At the 
outset, each patient should be told of the twenty to thirty percent chance of 
multiple pregnancy and of the fetal reduction procedure that would  be used to 
limit the difficulties should a multiple pregnancy occur.111  If these facts are 
fully and fairly disclosed, most courts would probably not protect the patients 
even if their bargaining position is woefully weak vis a vis the fertility 
doctor.112 
The starting point of the contractual inquiry is to examine what the doctor 
and clinic have promised the patient.  Clinics that have made “money-back 
guarantees,”113 often to younger patients, have provided partial refunds to 
those that undergo several cycles of unsuccessful treatment..114  Of course 
“success” may be defined in several ways.  Presumably, the patient would be 
expecting one fetus to be born alive and well.  Some clinics might define 
success, however, as merely successful conception.  The exact promise would 
have to be carefully analyzed. 
Assuming that the promise was for a successful birth, would high order 
multiple birth be defined as success, blocking the money-back guarantee?  One 
assumes that the fertility doctors would see the promise this way,115 
particularly with the selective reduction procedure available to “cull out” 
unlucky supernumerary embryos. 
“Success” in this context does not seem to me to include a pregnancy that 
results in triplets or more unless the patient was sufficiently warned of the risk 
of such a “high-order” multiple birth.  If the doctor did not give these timely 
warnings and a multiple pregnancy resulted, and then, when told of selective 
reduction, the patient declined, the doctor may have breached his promise to 
achieve “success.”  The next hurdle for the patient/client would of course be 
whether her remedy for this “failure” would be limited to the terms of the 
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 110. For example, “baby FTC acts” such as Chapter 93A of the Massachusetts General Laws 
apply to unfair and deceptive practices by physicians.  Telephone conversation of the author with 
Pasqua Scibelli, Assistant Attorney General of Massachusetts (Oct. 5, 1999).  See MASS GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 2 (West 1997); Fitzgerald v. Goldberg, No. 94-6620-E, 1998 WL 77880 
(Mass. Super.); Bartels v. Leighton, No. 91233, 1994 WL 879548 (Mass. Super.); Little v. 
Rosenthal, 382 N.E.2d 1037 (Mass. 1978). 
 111. See Cowley & Springen, supra note 81. 
 112. See Daar, supra note 7, at 840. 
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money-back guarantee.  It seems that it might not be so limited, due to the 
elements of adhesion and unconscionability in the contract. 
Generally, doctors try to avoid contracting to provide a specific result, such 
as one healthy child.  Such promises may be actionable in contract if the result 
is otherwise than promised.116  Fertility clinics that give money-back 
guarantees117 may, however, be promising just such a result.  A court or jury 
might not limit the remedy to restitution of the amounts paid; they may find 
such a limitation of remedy unconscionable due to the adhesive character of 
the contract itself or the unequal bargaining power that produced it. 
Lawyers generally prefer to subsume any contract claim under a tort 
theory, in this case one of simple malpractice or possibly, wrongful 
conception.118  The exception is where, as in Sullivan v. O’Connor, the 
plaintiff’s attorney thinks there are assurances by the doctor that a specific 
result would be achieved.119  If assurances are made in the literature of the 
fertility clinic or by its staff that the procedure would result in a normal 
pregnancy producing only one child,120 perhaps a contract claim could be 
raised.  As to damages, the court in Sullivan gave alternatives to restitution 
based on the reliance or expectation measures.121  Reliance damages in such a 
case could give the patient all that was spent on the children born in excess of 
the expected number.  Perhaps the mother’s excess suffering would also be 
compensable under this measure. 
Emotional distress damages might also be awarded for breach of 
contract.122  Surely, doctors and fertility clinics could reasonably expect 
emotional distress in a patient when a multiple pregnancy occurs.  Not only is a 
pregnancy involving multiple fetuses more stressful that the norm, but the sight 
of her premature and afflicted newborns could be expected to cause severe and 
prolonged emotional distress in the mother. 
Thus, Sullivan opens a host of possibilities for the plaintiff’s lawyer.  
While a tort count in malpractice is the most obvious way to proceed, 
negligence may be hard to prove.  By contrast, a contract count may be a 
straightforward winner if the plaintiff can prove that there were promises and 
assurances by the doctor or  clinic that the pregnancy, if achieved, would not 
produce multiple infants.  The trick is to find those assurances.  Even if the 
assurances did not rise to the level of bargained-for promises, if it was 
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reasonable for the patient to rely on them, promissory estoppel might lie, with 
the possibility of reliance or expectation damages.123 
E. Tort 
At least one major malpractice case brought for a drug-induced multiple 
pregnancy has been successfully settled for plaintiffs.  On May 21, 1985, Patti 
Frustaci, a  thirty year old high school teacher from Riverside, California, gave 
birth to the first septuplets born in the United States.124  This multiple birth 
quickly, and rather predictably, turned tragic.  All the infants were born  twelve 
weeks premature.  One infant was stillborn and three others died within weeks 
of respiratory failure.125  The four month hospitalization of the surviving three 
infants generated over one million dollars in hospital bills.126  According to 
Judith Daar, “seven years after their birth, the three children continue to suffer 
severe physical and developmental impairment, including cerebral palsy and 
serious eye problems.”127 
According to Professor Daar, “[s]hortly after their third surviving child 
was discharged from the hospital, the Frustacis filed a lawsuit alleging 
malpractice and wrongful death  against the fertility specialist and the fertility 
medical center involved in Mrs. Frustaci’s treatment.”128  The Frustacis alleged 
that Mrs. Frustaci was not properly monitored with ultrasound screening to 
detect how many eggs were ready for fertilization, following treatment with 
the fertility drug Perganol.  Almost six years later, the lawsuit was settled and 
the fertility center paid the Frustacis 6.2 million dollars.129 
Apparently, selective reduction was offered to Mrs. Frustaci early in her 
pregnancy, but she rejected it.130  By reducing the number of fetuses from 
seven to two or three, Mrs. Frustaci could have optimized her opportunity to 
deliver full-term, healthy infants.  Daar concludes that the availability of this 
procedure should be disclosed to the patient whenever the fertility treatment 
involved carries a risk of multiple births; “[t]his disclosure must come early in 
the treatment process so that a woman who would reject the procedure, as did 
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Patti Frustaci, can make an informed decision about the course of her 
therapy.”131 
Just what are women contemplating fertility treatment told about the 
option of selective reduction?  According to Daar, “there are two schools of 
thought [among doctors] on whether a doctor should discuss the procedure at 
early stages of therapy—one says yes, the other no. . . .”132  Doctors who do 
not make an “up front” disclosure rationalize their behavior (which appears to 
have a profit motive) by arguing that such a disclosure would be too upsetting 
to a person who is doing everything possible to create life, not destroy it.133 
Whatever individual doctors may think, the legal doctrine of informed 
consent provides  a legal answer to the dilemma.  Informed consent protects 
the right of the patient to make a knowledgeable decision about her body.  
Thus, even where the medical procedure is successful despite the failure of 
disclosure, the woman’s right to informed consent is compromised. 
The first test for informed consent was announced in 1957 by the 
California Court of Appeals in Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Board 
of Trustees:134 
A physician violates his duty to his patient and subjects himself to liability [in 
tort] if he withholds any facts which are necessary to form the basis of an 
intelligent consent by the patient to the proposed treatment.  Likewise the 
physician may not minimize the known dangers of a procedure . . . to induce 
his patient’s consent.135 
This is the patient’s “right to have all information that is material” 
standard.136  The majority test, somewhat more difficult from the plaintiff’s 
point of view, is the “professional standard.”137  This test does not focus  on the 
information the patient “needs” to make an informed decision, but on the level 
of disclosure practiced by other doctors regarding the procedure in question.138 
In the case of a woman contemplating fertility therapy, the Salgo standard 
requires the doctor to decide which facts a reasonable woman in the patient’s  
position would find material in her decision-making process.139  Once warned 
of the possibility of multiple pregnancy, the patient should be told about the 
treatment options for multiple pregnancy, including selective reduction.  Since 
a woman may initially accept or reject a proposed fertility treatment based on 
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the information about possible multiple births, her initial decision in this regard 
may also change in light of information about selective reduction.  Thus, early 
information about selective reduction would be material to her decision-
making process. 
While some doctors purportedly withhold information about selective 
reduction for fear that their patients may not wish to contemplate terminating 
one or more of their fetuses, these patients have a right to know early on that 
such an option exists.140  By analogy, courts have held that under certain 
circumstances, physicians are under a duty to disclose the option of abortion to 
their patients.141 
In Berman v. Allan,142 the parents of a child born with Down’s syndrome 
sued the doctor who had treated the mother during pregnancy for failure to 
inform her about the availability of amniocentesis.  They alleged that had they 
known about the procedure the mother would have submitted to it.143  Upon 
learning that her child would suffer from Down’s syndrome, she would then 
have aborted the fetus.144  The court held that this “loss of her right to abort the 
fetus”145 caused compensable harm to the parents under the doctrine of 
wrongful birth.146 
Thus, if a woman undergoing fertility treatment is not timely told of the 
risk of a multiple pregnancy and the necessity of selective reduction to treat it, 
she may have a cause of action in tort for wrongful birth in the case of 
defective newborns.  Causes of action may also lie for wrongful death for any 
infants who died, and for wrongful conception for those unwanted children 
who survived in reasonable health.147 
The wrongful birth suit might compensate the parents of a defective 
newborn resulting from multiple pregnancy by awarding the expenses of 
ordinary and extraordinary medical care and education of the child, the 
expenses and pain and suffering of the mother during pregnancy, and the 
emotional distress of the parents.148  By contrast, damages for wrongful 
conception or pregnancy149 resulting in relatively normal children could 
compensate the mother for her pain and suffering during pregnancy,  medical 
 
 140. See id. at 841. 
 141. Id. 
 142. 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979). 
 143. See id. at 10. 
 144. See id. 
 145. Id. at 14. 
 146. See id. 
 147. See Weinman, supra note 118, at 176-79. 
 148. See id. at 177. 
 149. Cf. Fred Norton, Assisted Reproduction and the Frustration of Genetic Affinity: Interest, 
Injury, and Damages, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 793, 796 (1999) (discussing the interest parents have in 
bearing children with whom they share symbolically identifying traits.  Norton believes that this 
interest is a significant motivation in the decision to use assisted reproductive technology.). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
476 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44:451 
expenses, and perhaps emotional distress.  The husband might also recover for 
loss of consortium.  Such damages might have to be offset, however, by the 
value of having a child in the first place.150 
Can the doctors protect themselves from potential lawsuits by fully 
informing the fertility patient before therapy begins of both the possibility of 
multiple birth151 and of the option of selective reduction to treat the multiple 
pregnancy?  Several possibilities emerge.  If the doctor does not initially 
disclose the risk of multiple pregnancy (rare today) then  he would not initially 
disclose the option of selective reduction.  If the patient is only told of the 
option of selective reduction during the multiple pregnancy,  it would seem 
that she could decline it and still have an action for a birth–related tort.  If the 
risk of multiple pregnancy is initially disclosed, but not the option of selective 
reduction, a disclosure of the latter during pregnancy would seem similarly 
actionable for the reasons Daar adduced above.152 
What if, however, the doctor makes a timely disclosure of both the risk of 
multiple-pregnancy and the option of selective reduction?  In this case it would 
seem that no action would lie, whether or not selective reduction is performed.  
Although the fertility clinic may lose business by such frank, up-front 
disclosure, they would protect themselves from both tort and contract liability. 
F. The Fiduciary Relationship 
In the case of drug-induced multiple pregnancies, any breach of the 
physician’s “fiduciary” duty  to the woman patient would be the result of 
failing to disclose at the outset of treatment both the risks of multiple 
pregnancy and the necessity of selective reduction if the treatment were to 
produce too many fetuses.  While the failure to disclose may cause the patient 
financial injury, the doctor is not misappropriating the patient’s expenses.  
Thus, the doctor’s duty to his patient seems adequately covered by contract and 
tort causes of action. The only legal gain I can see from calling the doctor’s 
breach a fiduciary one is that such a breach might be more easily found: it 
would not have to involve a specific breach of contract or a neglectful violation 
of the standard of care.  Since the problem is ultimately one of full disclosure, 
the tort theory of informed consent appears to address it.  Although Moore v. 
Regents of the University of California153 identifies the tort of breach of 
fiduciary duty by a doctor toward his patient, that precedent might be limited 
to the situation where the doctor misappropriates the patient’s property for 
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personal gain.154  However, this mixing of tort and fiduciary law might 
arguably be extended to provide a viable cause of action in the multiple-
pregnancy situation.155 
IV.  SUMMARY 
A. Unconsented Sperm Harvesting 
In cases of unconsented sperm retrieval, the case-by-case common law 
approach is not particularly helpful when damages are sought.  The first 
problem is that the party whose interests are most directly affected—the 
comatose or dead man— is not, for obvious reasons, in a position to protect 
himself.  That leaves his protection in the hands of a guardian or representative 
who may in fact be the woman requesting the sperm retrieval.  Unless there is 
an independent authority to intervene at the hospital when the request is made, 
the decision to harvest the sperm will be made at the doctor’s whim.  The only 
hope would be for such a person to get a court order to somehow prevent 
insemination of the woman with the harvested sperm.  There would only be 
time to obtain this court order if the sperm was to be frozen for future use, but 
not if the doctors involved were to perform an insemination immediately after 
the retrieval. 
Who might want to legally intervene in the sperm harvesting process?  The 
most likely candidates are the man’s existing children, if any.  If the man is 
comatose, but not dead, these children face the real risk of having to share their 
father’s estate with a newcomer.  If the man is dead, there is much less 
likelihood that any child would be considered a child and/or heir of the father, 
although the Hart case opens up this possibility.156 
Under the Hart case, the public may also have to support the infant, 
although this would not be a concern motivating the children to intervene 
legally.  If the outcome in Hart were to become routine, the state might 
eventually feel it necessary to intervene to protect the public purse.  However, 
this would only seem possible via statute or regulations, which most states do 
not seem likely to enact because of political pressures. 
Assuming that existing children of the man were able to intervene legally 
before conception, what would be the gravamen of their complaint?  As we 
have noted, they may have a potential financial interest as heirs if state law 
would declare the child of such harvesting to be an heir of the decedent.  If the 
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man died intestate, the new child would take the same portion of the estate as 
existing children.  If the man died testate, the new child might, in some states, 
be considered a pretermitted child and take a share.157  These financial interests 
might be sufficient to get an injunction against use of the sperm before 
insemination, but once the woman is impregnated and the new embryo is 
granted “heir” status by state law,158 others would appear incapable of 
intervening under wills law. 
What about tort law as a more direct way to compensate the children 
already born?  The Christensen case159 seems to give such children the chance 
to show that they suffered from negligently inflicted emotional distress as a 
result of the physician’s  unconsented battery or mutilation of their father, even 
though they may have been kept away from the procedure.  One problem is 
that the negligent infliction of emotional distress is often not seen as an 
independent tort; thus there must be an underlying battery or other tort.160  If 
the man were dead, the woman requesting the sperm might well have statutory 
authority over the disposition of the cadaver, including its’ parts and tissues.161  
 
 157. See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 33, at 550-60. Pretermitted child statutes 
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In the case of a comatose man, this same woman might have the legal authority 
to dispose of tissues if such disposal would not be life threatening.162  The 
question, however, is whether sperm is similar enough to other tissues to fall 
under her authority.  I argue, with others,163 that semen is dissimilar to other 
tissue because of its’ potential for producing life and should not come under 
any such authority. 
The same conclusion should hold for tissue cloned for reproductive 
purposes, when that technology is perfected.164  Some may disagree, however, 
and find the intrusion justifiable, thereby eliminating the underlying tort of 
battery or mutilation of the cadaver.  Even if the underlying tort were found, 
the question of whether the emotional distress from electroejaculation or 
simple incision in the man’s body is sufficient to be compensable.  All in all, 
the children, even under tort, may have a tough time prevailing.  Even if they 
were awarded minor damages, they would not have succeeded in stopping 
either the feared behavior or the problems it may cause them in the future.  
Therefore, an injunction, either against the procedure itself or against the use 
of the retrieved sperm, is the most useful remedy. 
If the underlying tort were not proven, emotional distress damages could 
be supported under breach of contract.  In Lamm v. Shingleton,165  a widow 
who watched her husband’s vault rise above the ground following burial, was 
compensated for her severe emotional distress.166  There, however, the party 
claiming emotional distress was in privity of contract with the undertaker, who 
breached the contract for a proper burial.  Here, the children are not parties to 
the underlying contract.  A suit for emotional damages by the children will lie 
only if the breach of any contract, even one not made with the party claiming 
emotional harm, is held to support a claim for emotional distress damages.  
While this seems plausible, courts are unlikely at this juncture to extend the 
existing, narrow exception to the general rule that penal damages are not 
allowed in a contract action.167 
Due to these difficulties, it is my reluctant conclusion that lawsuits for 
damages are probably not the answer to the unconsented sperm harvesting 
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problem.  In many cases an injunction may be effective if a proper plaintiff can 
be found to bring the action in time.  Otherwise, the government will have to 
develop a compelling  interest (perhaps through the necessity of its paying for 
these unauthorized children) to have both the will to intervene and the 
constitutional authority to do so. 
B. Drug-Induced Multiple Pregnancies 
My conclusion is different, however, in the case of drug-induced multiple 
pregnancies. There are some real possibilities, particularly for tort lawyers 
under traditional malpractice theory or the new tort of wrongful conception, 
against a fertility industry with deep pockets. 
The consensus of academic opinion appears to be that there is an 
affirmative constitutional right to procreate that probably includes the right to 
procreate using assisted reproduction technologies.168  Although the Supreme 
Court has never specifically held that there is such a right, there is ample 
reason to believe it would if the opportunity arose.  After all, it is hard to see 
procreation as anything other than a fundamental human right.  It is not so 
clear whether the Supreme Court would, despite the fundamental nature of the 
right, hold that the government has an obligation to help persons pay for such 
treatment when they cannot afford it.169 
The result is probably that anyone paying for fertility services can have 
them on whatever basis she and her doctor decide, with very little fear of 
government intrusion.  Given the proximity of assisted reproduction issues to 
those of abortion, it is highly unlikely that legislators are going to find the 
“compelling state interest”170 necessary to regulate the fertility industry.  In 
fact, the most we can probably hope for is disclosure legislation which treats 
the fertility patient either as a general consumer or as a special type of one.  
Thus, although government regulation is generally preferable to indirect 
regulation through the common law because of its power to deal with problems 
before they happen, the common law is likely to provide the chief regulatory 
mechanism in this area. 
We start with the strong bias of an American system that leaves the 
complex and emotionally-charged issues of assisted reproduction to private 
contract between patient and doctor/fertility center.  However, fertility patients 
are among the more desperate patients that doctors see.  They are willing to put 
up with all sorts of invasive, painful, costly and uncertain procedures in hope 
of conceiving and delivering a child.  This sets the contract model askew, due 
to the gross disparity in bargaining power between a fertility doctor and that 
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doctor’s patient.  Thus, private contract is not a particularly good way of 
regulating fertility matters before a dispute arises. 
Fertility doctors will claim that this disparity in bargaining power means 
little because self-regulation by the doctors prescribes what services they offer 
and how they deliver them.  The fact remains, however, that these doctors and 
clinics are in competition with one another for patients and that no mandatory 
guidelines have been placed on them by any medical group.  Thus, market 
pressures are always present. If one doctor will not harvest the sperm from a 
dead or comatose man at a woman’s request, then another probably will.  If 
one doctor refuses aggressive drug therapy to overstimulate egg production 
during a cycle, then another will probably prescribe it.  If one doctor will, after 
IVF, implant only three embryos for fear of causing multiple pregnancy, 
another may implant nine to increase chances of success.  Competition, the 
driving engine of capitalism, is hard at work in reproductive medicine.  The 
result is that medical ethics are constantly under pressure, with quantifiable 
“results” usually trumping the ethicists’ pleas for caution. 
The health insurance industry is another potential regulator of assisted 
reproduction.  If the industry will not pay a doctor to harvest sperm from a 
dead or comatose man, nor for the freezing of that sperm or implantation of it 
in his wife or lover, this will diminish demand for such services.  One can 
imagine a regime under which such procedures would be covered by insurance 
when there is prior written consent of the donor, but not otherwise.  But the 
problem is that all these procedures are relatively simple and inexpensive.  
Sperm retrieval and artificial insemination are straightforward in themselves, 
and although freezing of the sperm may be desired, presumably such storage 
will be of short duration and at little expense.  Thus, the health insurance 
industry cannot be counted on for regulation because of the lack of financial 
incentives for them to do more. 
The health insurance industry may have more to say about drug-induced 
multiple pregnancies, with or without the use of IVF.  To the extent these 
pregnancies become frequent, the costs of hospitalization for mother and 
infants becomes a factor for the insurance industry.  For now, in states like 
Massachusetts where fertility services must be covered,171 the industry appears 
to be concentrating on the cost of the treatments themselves.  So far their 
policing of this end of the problem seems counterproductive.  What they 
demand from fertility clinics is high success rates.172  This pressures the clinics 
to overstimulate egg production to improve these success rates.  Not only does 
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such overstimulation increase the risk of high-order multiple-pregnancies 
(three or more children), it puts the mother’s health at risk.173 
As long as “success rates” of clinics can stay high enough to satisfy the 
health insurance industry without inducing enough high-order multiple 
deliveries to concern insurers, insurers will accept the high costs of the 
relatively few such deliveries they have to bear.  Only if greater use of fertility 
drugs increases costs to insurance companies can we expect them to penalize 
clinics producing too many multiple pregnancies. 
In states that do not mandate or offer coverage of fertility services, the 
question arises whether a given policy would cover pregnancy and neonatal 
expenses resulting from assisted reproduction.  Although most do, insurers 
might seek to exclude or limit such coverage in the future.174  If, however, a 
given insurer did not cover fertility treatments, but had to cover expenses of 
the pregnancy and neonatal care, it would still have an incentive to reduce a 
fertility clinic’s record of multiple pregnancies.  But because such a company 
would not be covering the fertility treatments themselves, it would seem to 
have no leverage to prevent multiple pregnancies in the first place. 
With neither the government, the medical profession, nor the health 
insurance industry in a good position to regulate assisted reproduction issues, 
we must reluctantly turn to after-the-fact policing by private lawyers.  If there 
are enough successful lawsuits against the doctors, not only will individual 
clients be recompensed, but their recompense will caution doctors to better 
behave themselves in the future. 
In sum, the lawyer with a client who has endured a drug-induced high-
order multiple pregnancy with its attendant costs and suffering should first 
examine the exact nature of the relationship between fertility doctor and 
patient.  Although the possibility of bringing the tort action should be foremost 
in the lawyer’s mind, contract is important here.  Sullivan v. O’Connor reminds 
us that a jury reluctant to find medical negligence may still find that the 
contract is breached.175 
Most clinics and fertility doctors are careful not to make guarantees, 
whether of a “money-back” nature or otherwise.  The job of the lawyer is then 
to comb the literature and statements of the fertility clinic to find actionable 
promises, whether of an expressly contractual nature or sufficient to support an 
action of promissory estoppel.  According to Sullivan, either reliance or 
expectation damages might be awarded for breach of contract, with the 
reliance measure including damages for pain and suffering as well as costs 
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incurred.176  Further, the case notes that restitution damages might also be 
available, but would be unsatisfactory since they are limited to amounts paid 
for the doctor’s fee.177  However, if the restitution damages in the high-order 
multiple birth case could include costs paid by the family not only for the 
fertility services, but by extension, those for the pregnancy and neonatal care, 
this measure might also be attractive.178  If the successful count was 
promissory estoppel, reliance or expectation damages are also generally 
available. 
What if no actionable promises can be found?  Then we are in the realm of 
tort, where the questions center around whether the doctor exhibited the 
requisite standard of care in a scenario that ended up with a high-order multiple 
birth.179  If he or she has not, the action could succeed under a generalized 
malpractice (negligence) theory or under the newer concept of wrongful 
conception, which holds the doctor/clinic liable for failing to prevent unwanted 
infants, even if born normal.180  Damages in these actions can be quite high 
and could include costs of the treatments to mother and children, physical and 
emotional distress of the mother, emotional distress for other family members 
and, in the case of malpractice, (rather than wrongful conception, which is 
limited to parental injury), perhaps the physical and mental distress of the 
infants themselves.181  A wrongful death action might also be brought on 
behalf of an infant in a high-order multiple-birth who succumbs to his 
deficiencies.182  The prospect of high damages in such a malpractice case 
presumably brought the Frustacis their large settlement for Patti Frustaci’s 
1985 septuplets. 
There are other tort claims that might be made in these scenarios.  Whether 
or not the doctors’ actions reached the standard of medical malpractice (which 
in jurisdictions like Massachusetts, juries notoriously refuse to find),183 there is 
also the tort of failure to receive the patient’s informed consent to a 
procedure.184  Several scenarios can be envisioned in which fertility patients 
are not timely informed of the risk and consequences of multiple pregnancies 
and of the necessity of selective reduction if multiple births are to be avoided.  
Under the modern approach, such a failure to timely inform would generally be 
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treated under a negligence theory (rather than as an intentional tort) and 
possible damages would be similar to those for other forms of negligence. 
Furthermore, the doctor-patient relationship may be seen as a 
“confidential” or “fiduciary” relationship which can be abused by the doctor in 
a tortious way.This cause of action was expressly recognized by the court in 
Moore,185 although the reference there was to the gaining of monetary 
compensation by the doctors via the unauthorized use of their patient’s cells.  
Although the specific outlines of the cause of action and resultant damages are 
left unclear in Moore, there are analogies that can be drawn from ordinary 
fiduciary law.  The doctor, like a trustee, owes certain duties to his or her 
“beneficiary” (the patient); primary among these would seem to be the placing 
of that patient’s interests above those of all others, including himself.  Just as a 
trustee can be surcharged for violation of this duty of loyalty to the beneficiary, 
so could the doctor be liable for violation of such a duty to his patient. 
Arguably, failure by the doctor/clinic to timely advise the patient of the 
multiple pregnancy/selective reduction problems might be seen as directly 
benefiting the fertility doctor’s own financial interest or that of his or her 
clinic.  When the interests of the patient are placed second to the doctor’s 
profit, the doctor and/or clinic should at least be liable to the patient for the 
profit thereby wrongfully obtained.  Whether this rather limited theory of 
damages obtained from general fiduciary law could be expanded if the abuse 
here was seen as tortious would be a question for future courts. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
There are numerous possibilities for the lawyer attacking, after the fact, the 
fertility doctor’s involvement in an unwanted high-order multiple pregnancy.  
This stands in sharp contrast to the chances for the private bar to control 
unconsented sperm harvesting, except by injunctions offering no direct 
financial incentive to a plaintiff.  Just as tort lawyers have successfully targeted 
other “deep-pocket” industries such as asbestos and tobacco, they may be 
encouraged to turn their attention to the problems such as high-order multiple 
pregnancies that arise in a largely unregulated fertility industry.  If a number of 
lawyers start suing and winning after the fact, in these situations there will be a 
benefit before the fact: doctors and clinics can be expected to be much more 
careful about their consent and disclosure procedures.  As imperfect as these 
solutions may be, they may provide some answers for victims of multiple 
births like those of the Frustacis.  By contrast, those seeking compensation for 
unconsented sperm harvesting from dead or comatose males must probably 
await governmental action.  The possibility of such action seems remote unless 
a number of children result from this procedure and become a burden on the 
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state.  Plaintiffs will thus probably have to be content with injunctive relief 
based on the common law actions mentioned in this article. 
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